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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

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1. Khrushchev at the UN: Khrushchev's presence in New York for the opening of the 15th UNGA dominated the Soviet press, which sought to build-up to Khrushchev's speech scheduled for September 23. Counterpoints to Khrushchev's "great initiative" on peace were allegations that the US is trying unsuccessfully to deprecate the importance of Khrushchev's mission and to sabotage the idea of a meeting of heads of governments at the UN. US ruling circles were compared to Rip Van Winkle, confronted with a new correlation of world forces, the collapse of Western influence in the colonial world, growing Soviet power, the worldwide support for Soviet policies aimed at preserving peace. The US was pictured as ineffectually combating Khrushchev's public relations appeal through such measures as restricting his movements to Manhattan and attempts to get the American press to play down Khrushchev's activities. One of the undertones of press comment was that perhaps the UN should be transferred to another country, since the US is unable to provide a proper atmosphere for UN functions.

Although it could not escape attention of even the badly informed Soviet public that the Soviets sustained a setback in efforts to bypass the UN in the Congo, Soviet press readers were fed with a number of themes designed to illustrate the growth of Soviet and decline of US influences in the UN; the assumption that the admission of new African members will lead to the disruption of the US "voting machine" in UN; the presence of many heads of governments at the UN and widespread acceptance of "peaceful coexistence" by non-communist speakers despite US opposition; the drop in the US stock market allegedly owing to alarm of munitions industries at the prospect of disarmament.

Initial coverage of President's September 22 speech was minimal: details of his proposals for developing Africa and demilitarization of outer space were not mentioned. The President's speech was given scarcely more attention than those of other delegation heads on September 22.

2. Berlin-Germany: The Soviet public was informed for the first time in some detail about the current GDR measures against West German access to Berlin by an Izvestiya article this week. The article, which was relatively temperate in tenor, justified the actions by the Sovzone regime as legitimate protection in the face of "militaristic-revanchist provocations." The article also reported Sov. Gen Zakharov's rejection of the Allied protest and referred briefly to Western counter-measures as creating an iron-curtain between "the two German states."

The anniversary of the Soviet-GDR agreement of September 30, 1955 was hailed throughout the Soviet press. However, the reportage, (including articles by GDR FonMin Bolz and DepFonMin Winzer) was uniformly mild in contrast to the aggressive statements reportedly made on the occasion in East Berlin.

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The US reply to the Soviet protest against the [redacted] was returned by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 19 with the explanation that [redacted]

3. Congo developments, both in the Congo itself and at the UN Security Council and special General Assembly, were given progressively less coverage in the Soviet press as the tide of events ran against Moscow. The enforced withdrawal of Soviet Embassy personnel in Leopoldville was covered over by an official statement describing the measure as a temporary one and affirming Soviet friendship for the Congolese people. Press coverage of the UN developments must have been somewhat bewildering to the Soviet public, which learned that the USSR had exercised the veto in the Security Council in opposition to a joint Tunisian-Ceylonese resolution, had then opposed the convening of a special General Assembly after arguing that the US was trying to prevent the broadest consideration of the Congo problem, and had then abstained in the vote on the 17-country Afro-Asian resolution. The press strove to cover up Soviet maladroitness -- by reporting, for instance, that the General Assembly had adopted the Afro-Asian resolution "by a majority." An Izvestiya (Sept.19) remark on the Security Council vote to the effect that "only" the bloc states defended the interests of the Congolese people exemplified Moscow's difficulties in explaining Congo developments to its own public.

4. Laos: The Soviet press has given only perfunctory attention to developments in Laos. On September 22 Pravda published a declaration of the Soviet Government on events in Laos which offered Soviet sympathy to the people of Laos, promised careful Soviet attention to developments in view of Soviet responsibility as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, but failed to mention any specific counter-action in the event of foreign military intervention in Laos. The declaration indicates that the Soviets are maintaining a relatively restrained posture on Laos, consistent with previous Soviet caution in this area, and possibly reinforced by recent Soviet experience in the Congo.

5. Ideological debate affecting Moscow-Peiping relations continued in an article entitled "The Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Present Time" by A. Belyakov and F. Burlatskiy, which appeared in the latest issue of Kommunist (No. 13, 1960). The article was notable not so much for any new contribution to the debate as for the firmness with which it restated Khrushchev's theses on the non-inevitability of war, the nature and results of war under contemporary conditions, and acquisition of power by the "workers" by peaceful means. While calling for a struggle on two fronts, against both right revisionism and left sectarianism, the article was devoted almost exclusively to refuting the latter deviation. Communist China was mentioned at several points in the article in contexts evidently intended to show that Chinese experience, especially in regard to the formation of a broad popular front, was essentially the same as in other Communist countries. The intent of such passages presumably was to undercut Chicom arguments on the uniqueness of Chinese conditions as justification for departures from Soviet example and precept.

Meanwhile the Embassy learned from a reliable source that the number of Chinese students at Moscow University in the new academic year does not appear substantially different from last year's attendance.

6. Soviet Assistance to Algerian Workers: The Soviet Association of Trade Unions announced a decision to send 2 million rubles worth of medical supplies, etc., to the General Association of Algerian Workers in response to an Algerian request. The announcement also reported that the Soviet Association will invite 120 Algerian workers to the USSR for technical training and a group of Algerian children for a vacation in a Soviet Pioneer Camp.

The statement marked the first published reference to training Algerians in the USSR, although the shipping of medical supplies has been previously publicized here.

7. Operation Hold-Fast: The Soviet press has given relatively heavy coverage to the NATO "Hold Fast" maneuvers in Schleswig Holstein and Denmark. Initial emphasis was devoted to contrasting the war maneuvers with the opening of the UNGA on the same day.

However, coverage of "Hold Fast" has continued to appear in some detail particularly in Red Star, organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. These reports, while stressing such things as alleged Danish complaints about "Nazi Generals," etc., have also included considerable detail on the number of Allied nations participating, troops involved, and equipment employed.

INTERNAL

8. Leadership: There have been so few indications of public activity by top Soviet party - government officials here during the past week that, even for a period when N.S.KHRUSHCHEV is creating headlines elsewhere, it seems abnormal. Most of the Moscow-resident members of the Central Committee Presidium seem to have dropped from sight, (or, like A.B.ARISTOV, have not reappeared) giving the impression that First Deputy Council of Ministers Chairman A.N.KOSYGIN has been left practically in sole charge of affairs here in Moscow. N.A.MUKHITDINOV appeared in public only twice (at a Mexican Embassy reception September 16 and with Kosygin at a GDR Embassy reception September 20), and Ye. A. FURTSEVA's presence in Moscow was recorded in a short press note on the opening of a "Baltic" art exhibit September 19. (It is a little curious that there seems to have been no press mention of her presence at the ceremonial opening of an exhibition of the 15th century painter Andrei RUBLYOV September 16, a function at which she is said to have presided.)

Perhaps to bolster the Moscow "staff" during the apparent absence of Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman L. I. BREZHNEV, Ya. E. Kalnberzin has come to Moscow. Since his "demotion" from Latvian CP First Secretary to Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium in November 1959, he rarely has been sighted except at gatherings of the entire CC Presidium. Functioning in his second capacity as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, he

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was the senior greeter at the return of the Soviet delegation from Mexico September 22. CC Presidium Member and RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman D.S. Polyanskiy's current "inspection" tour of the Soviet Far East is reported below.

9. RSFSR Premier Polyanskiy Tours Pacific Coast: D.S.POLYANSKIY, CC Presidium member and RSFSR Premier has been visiting the eastern Siberian cities of Magadan (September 15), Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (September 17-18) and Vladivostok (September 19-?). Abbreviated press accounts report that Polyanskiy is meeting local party and government officials, has attended gatherings and conferences of activists called to discuss "further economic and cultural growth" and made numerous visits to factories and farms. So far, Polyanskiy has not repeated any cities on the Siberian itinerary of the last CC "inspector," RSFSR Bureau Deputy Chairman A.B.ARISTOV, who visited Barnaul, Omsk and Ufa early in August. It is not unlikely that Polyanskiy has been travelling ever since September 10 when he was said to have officiated at the opening of a new metallurgical plant in Kuybyshev.

10. Party Troubles in Kirghizia: Early in September, the Kirghizia Party Central Committee Bureau criticized deficiencies in the Tyupskiy Raion Party Committee (Raikom) Bureau. Responding to that criticism, the first and second secretaries of the Tyupskiy Raikom were relieved of their posts by a September 19 plenum of the Raikom. (Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, September 18.) The following major grievances made against the secretaries were: (1) Serious deficiencies in work with cadres (personnel), (2) departure from Party principles of leadership, (3) neglect of Party work, (4) isolation of the leadership from the lower Party organization, and (5) superficial direction of the economy.

The secretaries were also dropped from membership in the Bureau of the Raikom. As an indication of the importance attached to this matter, the plenum was attended by Kirghiz CC First Secretary I.R.RAZZAKOV.

This report falls into a general pattern of press discussion currently criticizing inadequately-trained personnel in Kirghizia. For example, a recent plenum of the Oshskiy Obkom which Kirghiz CC Secretary V.N.ZAYCHIKOV attended also criticized the local party organ's work with personnel. However, no action was taken against responsible officials. Insufficient training of factory personnel, inefficient use of agricultural personnel, inadequate education of personnel in the spirit of honesty and strict discipline, and the failure of many workers to raise their level of knowledge were among the points emphasized.

11. Officials Implicated in Dacha Scandal: As a result of an investigation following criticism in Izvestia (July 30) which coupled Latvian functionaries with illegal manipulations to obtain dachas, the Latvian Council of Ministers and Party Central Committee have taken punitive action, extending to dismissal from positions and expulsion from the Party, against various secondary officials. (Izvestia, September 16 and Sovetskaya Latviya, Sept.17).

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Misappropriation of lumber, cement and other building materials is involved as well as the use of improper influence to provide access roads and building sites. The episode calls to mind a similar scandal in the Moscow Oblast early in 1959 which resulted in the removal of the two top party-government officials of the oblast. (WEEKA No. 11 of March 13, 1959).

Even if the implicated circle does not increase to include more important Latvian Party and government officials, the scandal may well bring about new regulations clarifying (and restricting) the extent to which building in the private sector will be permitted. The event also serves as a warning for those party officials with a "dual-standard," violating normal communist morality and discipline well in keeping with current campaigns against parasites, speculators and improving the tone of public morals.

12. Discontent Among Armed Forces Officer Personnel: Two long articles which appeared in Red Star this week (September 17 and 22) seem fairly good evidence that the morale of many career officers has been sufficiently affected by the reduction-in-force, increased Party influence and interference in the Soviet Armed Forces and other factors to bring them to the point of giving up their military careers.

Both articles involve young career officers who had reached the decision to request release and whose decisions are contested at length by a fellow comrade-in-arms in one instance and by a father, a retired officer, in the other. In neither case are the reasons for the officers' disillusionment explained beyond vague references to their having fallen under evil influences or having taken up with bad company with a resultant loss of perspective. One of the officers, a lieutenant who reportedly changed his mind and decided that being an officer was his proper "place in life," implied that he had been influenced by other fellow officers who had decided to leave the army.

Officer morale undoubtedly also is affected adversely by the increasing number of reports that demobilized officers are often encountering a cool welcome at the work sites in Siberia and elsewhere to which they have been "encouraged" to go. At best, they often have to wait long periods before adequate housing is provided, and there are reports of their being refused employment once the "employer" realizes that they are ex-officers entitled to costly privileges. As one example of the way some demobilized officers are being cheated out of the privileges supposedly guaranteed them by law, the Red Star lead editorial on September 20 cited case in which the officer was forced to sign a waiver of his housing rights before being accepted for employment at a factory. By leaving the military service voluntarily, an officer presumably may be able to exercise more freedom of choice as to the location of his "resettlement" than at the time of release under the reduction-in-force. This may outweigh the greater financial and other privileges for demobilized officers, especially if it seems apparent that these privileges frequently are withheld.

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